It Could Be Said #23 Half Measures Won't Help Ukraine
Will Cooling returns to talk at length about why The West must decide whether it wants Ukraine to join its club
There is cautious excitement that a peace deal may be in the offering between Ukraine and Russia, of which part would be Ukraine forgoing its aspirations to draw NATO whilst Russia agrees to drop its opposition to its neighbour joining the European Union.
This builds on Biden’s statement last week, which deliberately emphasised America’s protective guarantee to NATO, and left its key partner in the Western Alliance unsaid.
“I want to be clear: We will defend every inch of NATO territory with the full might of a united and galvanized NATO”
This may sound like a resolute statement, and the mooted compromise may sound fair. But these are either misleading pieces of sophistry or a dangerous miscalculation that could one-day see the world stumble into nuclear war based on a misunderstanding. As the Russians are finding out, there are no such things as half-measures in war and peace.
80s Nostalgia Has Finally Gone Too Far
Since Russia invaded Ukraine, we’ve all been acquainted with things that we thought we had left behind; a Great Power invading its neighbour, refugee camps in Europe, the threat of nuclear war. But perhaps most striking is the reassertion of the EU as a crucial pillar of the West, with Brussels galvanising not only its diffident Germanic talisman to action but also marshalling its non-NATO members and neighbours to firmly resist Russian adventurism.
This should not be a surprise. It’s not as if there wasn’t precedent that EU membership was incompatible with neutrality; Finland, Sweden and Austria all only joined the EU in 1995 after staying outside its predecessor organisations because of their Cold War neutrality. Indeed, the non-NATO states of the EU can be divided between those who either bordered what Ronald Reagan once called “The Evil Empire”, or in the case of Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus once belonged to Britain’s. Whereas the former clung to neutrality to maintain an independent existence from a continental hegemon, the latter used neutrality to express independence from a naval power that would seek to involve them in overseas adventures if given the chance. This difference can be seen in the odd definition the former British territories use for neutrality with the Mediterranean nations hosting substantial British army bases, whilst Ireland openly favoured British operations in the Second World War and NATO operations in the Cold War.
The cheering for the West’s robust response to Russian aggression has quelled much of what little criticism there was of NATO’s expansion. But if the Alliance has truly been revitalised it’s more important than ever to consider the rationale for what is still called the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Surely the Baltic Sea, let alone the Black Sea, are far away from the ocean that gave NATO it’s name.
Coast to Coast
There is a tendency to look at America and Canada’s participation in NATO as an act of charity towards a Britain and Europe unable or unwilling to defend itself. But when you look at NATO’s Cold War membership, it’s clearly working backwards from ensuring the North Atlantic doesn’t become a launch pad for attacks on North America:
Iceland, Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal directly border the Atlantic
Britain, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and Norway ensure control of the North Sea, which otherwise could be used to attack Britain and gain access to the Atlantic
Britain (Gibraltar plus bases in Cyprus and at one point Malta), France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, and Greece control the Mediterranean, stopping it being used as a route into the North Atlantic
Despite having few exposed coats, West Germany was crucial to the Western Alliance because it bordered six NATO members (Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, and Italy). It was essentially the first and last line of defence before the Soviets broke through to the North Atlantic. Their importance to Western defence against the Soviets is best demonstrated by the fact that nations who had twice (thrice in France’s case) been invaded by them in living memory, supported their remilitarisation in the 1950s.
Of course, the Cold War ended, and Germany reunited within NATO. At various points the Soviets secured promises from NATO to not expand further eastwards than Germany’s new border. It’s an open question whether who was more naïve; those who believed the promises or those who made them.
Before 1990, Germany was divided in such a way to cleave it by the seas it borders, the West got the North Sea, and the East got the Baltic. The former is the route to attack Britain, which if successful allows you to attack America. The latter is the route to directly attack Russia. But that logic flips when Germany is united within NATO. The Baltic Sea becomes a route from which Russia could attack Germany, and if Germany falls, the Russians can quickly advance towards the Atlantic and threaten North America. Suddenly Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia are the frontline of the Western Alliance whether NATO liked it or not. Likewise, Germany’s new southern border demanded that the remnants of the old Dual Monarchy be brought into the fold lest Germany or its neighbours risk fighting a war on two fronts. It is a testament to the unappreciated defensive logic of the West’s expansion that the eight continental European countries who joined the EU in 2004, all fall into either of these two categories. Given that they acquiesced to these enlargements in reasonably good grace and continued to work well with NATO, it seems like Russia agreed that these moves really were defensive, or at the very least, defensible.
Because contrary to hyperventilating about the Suwalki Gap, Russia’s actual concerns lie south.
Going South
It attracts less attention in Britain because this time our government did impose transitional controls, but the EU did not stop at unifying Western and Central Europe, but pushed further into Eastern Europe by adding Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. This meant the EU acquired control of almost the entirety of the west coast of the Black Sea, Russia’s only warm water entry to the wider world via the Turkish Straits. Then at its meeting in 2008, NATO said that it wanted both Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance as soon as both nations could meet the membership criteria. The result would see NATO control almost the entirety of the Black Sea’s coast, with Russia only having a relatively small redoubt in its top right corner, as far away from the Turkish Straits as is possible.
Russia responded immediately, seizing on the idiotic behaviour of Georgia’s then President to seize South Ossetia and humble its truculent Southern neighbour. This mirrored Russia’s behaviour in 1990, where they supported Moldavian separatists who established the unrecognised state of Transnistria that straddles the Moldo-Ukrainian border to the Black Sea. This desire to assert its position as a force to its south was also seen in its later intervention in the Syrian Civil War.
Despite these moves, work continued on an association agreement between the EU and Ukraine. It is funny that even now people, some of whom claimed to know better in 2016, still pretend that the EU is an economics-only body. I suggest they read Title II of the Association Agreement, titled “Political Dialogue and Reform, Political Association, Cooperation and Convergence in the field of Foreign and Security Policy”. Without relitigating Euromaiden, Russia responded to the second extra-constitutional removal of a pro-Russian Government in a decade by securing its most crucial security interest in the region by having the troops and sailors in Sevastopol stop pretending they didn’t run the place. They would also try to surreptitiously seize the Ukrainian provinces of Donbass and Luhansk, with Russian troops both aiding and posing as separatists. Taken together they would ensure Russian control of the Sea of Azoz, and much of what is effectively the northern coast of the Black Sea.
Much like with their operations in Moldova and Georgia, that may well have been where the story ended if it wasn’t for three things. Firstly, despite not objecting to the new status quo in any profound way, Britain and Eastern European countries started providing more and more military aid to Ukraine so changing the military balance between Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists. Secondly, whilst Ukraine did its usual thing of following up a period of intransigence by electing somebody who promised better relations with Russia, Volodymyr Zelenskyy could not deliver this, thereafter, reverting to pro-Western orthodoxy.
However, there’s a good argument that the most important events happened outside Ukraine. In 2020 and 2021 neighbouring Belarus was suddenly struck by a wave of protests, which forced President Lukashenko to seek support from Russia to prop up his regime. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had to do the same just this year after Kazakhstan was rocked by protests. Putin would not be human if he did not see these as echos of the “colour revolutions” that set the stage for NATO’s fateful invites in 2008. Add to that, there was the stunning and brutal success of Azerbaijan against Russian ally Armenia in a short and decisive war in 2020 due to the potency of Turkish drones, the same drones that everyone’s favourite frenemy was busily building for Ukraine. So, Putin was suddenly threatened with a defeat in the Donbass, which would call into question Russia’s control of the Sea of Azoz. This would be a defeat that would echo across the Black Sea and the various waterways it connects to via the Turkish Straits.
Black Sea or Black Soil?
As the Soviet Union dissolved there was a brief and bloody last stand for Russian imperialism in the Baltics, but the authorities in Moscow was soon persuaded to let Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia finally escape in a way that former “National Republics” bordering the Black Sea have not been able to. The question naturally becomes what is the goose and what is the egg; does Russia interfere in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia because it’s paranoid about losing control of the Black Sea, or does it care about the Black Sea because it helps it control its neighbours.
This is crucially important when thinking about what possible routes there are to end the war in Ukraine. If Russia is only concerned with securing the Black Sea, then you can see a route to peace which involves Ukraine ceding coastal Ukraine, so creating a landbridge from Transnistria through Crimea and the Donblass to Russia. Ukraine (and Moldova) is rewarded for this sacrifice by being placed on the express lane towards integration into the West. Alternatively, Russia wants to seize control of Ukraine’s coast not to control the Black Sea, but because a Ukraine isolated from the EU, would be dependent on Russia to export anything to the wider world.
There are good reasons to suspect it’s the later due to both Putin’s embrace blood and soil imperialism, and the longstanding consensus that Russia is a more secure and important country if it controls Ukraine. But it is surely worth at least trying to see whether Russia will allow Ukraine to go its own way in return for securing the aforementioned coastline coupled with the West eschewing any further integration of Georgia and maybe some agreed limits about what forces would be placed on Romania or Bulgaria’s coasts. And even if it’s not the preferred result of either side, the superior performance of the Russians in the South and South-East, means it’s likely to be the reality should a ceasefire be called due to peace talks or exhaustion.
And if Russia wants to just dominate Ukraine and Moldova? Then the West is faced with a dilemma for which there is no pleasant answer.
Why Did You Think The CIA Funded The European Movement?
The attraction of splitting the questions of NATO and EU membership is that viewed in isolation it is clearly ridiculous to welcome Ukraine into the NATO, as it has no defensive interest there. Again, remember that NATO’s mission is to ensure that the British Isles and Western Europe are not used as springboards for attack on North America. It has plenty of members throughout the Mediterranean far away from the Atlantic, that could intercept the Russian Navy.
The problem is that it is not as easy to waive the question of EU membership. The fundamental aim of the European Union is to export Western Europe liberalism to the rest of the continent, so facilitating the “ever closer union” first proclaimed in Rome back in 1957. Whilst much attention has been placed on some of the issues the EU has encountered in Eastern European countries such as Hungary and Poland, one cannot overlook the stunning success it has achieved in places that would have once been seen as illiberal backwaters (Ireland, Portugal, Spain) and those nations with long experiences of Russian/Soviet rule (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia). There is no limiting principle on the European Union other than that of Europe itself, hence its rejection of Morroco’s application to join in the 1980s, and its fraught relationships with the powers to its periphery; Britain, Turkey and Russia.
Not only is Europe interested in Ukraine, but the feeling is mutual. As Noah Smith outlined, Ukraine’s neighbours have pulled away from it due to being integrated into the German-led economy of the Single Market. They play the same role in the EU, as the American South or Mexico do in NAFTA, low-cost “Right to Work” areas, where industry relocates to take advantage of cheaper workers and land. Unlike Mexico’s place in NAFTA, the EU also offers easy access to better jobs and lifestyles in richer parts, if people are bold enough to make the move, hence the rapid depopulation experienced by many Eastern European countries pre-coronavirus. Unfortunately for Russia, it has no answer to this. Ever since the Orange Revolution, Vladimir Putin has been incapable of doing anything other than complain that Ukraine’s drift towards the West makes his country less secure, rather than building an argument why he can help his neighbour be more prosperous. As Matthew Yglesias persuasively argued, that is because Russia’s economy just isn’t built for the task of binding its neighbours to it, given its primarily focused on digging stuff out of its own ground and selling it overseas.
But that brings us back to the symbiotic relationship between NATO and the EU. Go back to Joe Biden’s statement. Does he truly believe that America or its allies, would do nothing to defend Finland or Sweden from Russian attack, two nations that have been part of the EU for almost two decades? Does he think that America would do nothing to defend Cyprus or Malta from Russian attack, two Islands that host British naval bases not only now, but throughout the Cold War? Does he think that Germany or Britain wouldn’t freak out if their next-door neighbours were conquered by opposing enemies?
The idea that any EU member could be left to fend for itself, without invalidating the fundamental idea of The West, is complete nonsense. There is a reason that when countries such as Finland and Austria were neutral during the Cold War to avoid provoking Russian invasion, they did not join what was then the EC. Today the EU is not only larger than its Cold War predecessor, but deeper too. Both the Single Market and Customs Union are more ruthlessly policed than their equivalents in the USA, leading to a concentration of industry in key European hubs, which suck in talent from the wider continent. Naturally this centralisation of key industries has been accompanied by measures to allow Europeans to move where the jobs are, with freedom of movement being turbo-charged by common citizenship, and the end of border controls in the Schengen Area. The centralisation of industry and workers naturally leads to unification of money, so people or companies can operate across Europe without fear of their wages, savings or payments, or investments being reduced to nothing by devaluation. And of course, the Lisbon Treaty commits all EU members to defend each other should they come under attack.
Indeed, this very centralisation has been unspoken mover of the EU’s response to the refugee crisis the war has caused, with the rest of the Schengen Area having no choice but to open their borders to Ukrainians given the refugee camps forming on Poland’s border with Ukraine. And it also works the other way, what Western European country would invest in an Eastern European country, if they had no assurances that Russian Troops couldn’t just swan in and steal everything they had built?
The idea of blocking Ukraine from joining NATO but keeping open the possibility of it joining the EU is yet more of the weasel words that got Ukraine and the wider world into this mess. If the West believes in Ukraine having a Western future, it should say so, and make the necessary commitments, including telling Russia it can’t invade it ever again lest it be met by Western forces. If the West would further prioritise friendly relations with Russia, at the cost of Ukraine being left to negotiate an understanding with its larger neighbour, then it should say so. Anything else is an insult to a nation that is fighting valiantly for a future that may not even exist.
It is also one that would fatally undermine the defence of the West more broadly.
My Map Of The World Lies In The World
It’s easy to forget as we enter the third week of Vladimir Putin’s reckless war of choice, but Ukraine let alone Europe isn’t the centre of the world. It isn’t even the centre of the growing challenges to the Western order, as can be seen by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia refusing to help lower oil prices, India and Pakistan refusing to join sanctions against Russia, and China considering providing active support to Putin’s regime as it struggles under the weight of unprecedented sanctions.
Ironically, the biggest alarm bell about where future problems will occur is that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all been fullhearted in their support for sanctioning Russia; much like how Bismarck’s map of Africa lay in Europe, their map of Ukraine lies in the South China Sea. They understand that only a resolute Western response to Western aggression can ensure that China does not repeat Putin’s criminal mistake and seek reunification with its nearest neighbour by force.
So amid the backslapping about European going further than anyone expected with sanctions or promises to increase defence spending, it should not be overlooked that other than those nations who border Ukraine, European diplomatic and security services were caught napping as America and Britain repeatedly raised the alarm at the prospect of an imminent invasion, to the extent that the Germany spy chief was still in Ukraine when the invasion began, and had to be evacuated by special forces! The same can be said with regards to the military aid, with Britain moving faster and further than Western European countries to provide equipment and training.
I say this not to praise Britain and America, nor to condemn Europe, but to highlight the incoherence of the situation. The West’s potential political and economic interest in Ukraine is Europe’s not that of America or Britain. Why were America or Britain being more aggressive (indeed still being more aggressive) towards Russia, than the confederation that Ukraine actually aspires to join? That’s clearly nonsensical, the EU should take the lead in determining to what extent the West integrates with Ukraine.
Of course, the root of this incoherence is that such nonsense has become integral to the EU itself. I wrote last year about how the lack of a European Army led to European nations wasting much of the money it spends on defence, something that still needs to be addressed if the recent announcements aren’t wasted through duplication, solider pay increases, and industrial featherbedding. But the incoherence also leads to the EU just not outlining clear policies when it comes to its external borders, with different actors within the byzantine polity encouraging neighbours to work towards membership, whilst others openly seek to stymie these efforts. That leads to outrageous spectacles such as how North Macedonia bent over backwards to placate the Greeks, only to find Bulgaria discovering grievances of its own, whilst France keeps threatening to veto ascension talks on the off-chance the latest roadblock can be overcome.
What has contributed to this confusion, is that America and Britain are more invested in resisting Russian adventurism wherever it occurs than Western Europe is. Neither nation does that much trade with Russia, and their armed forces or security services have no history of working closely with the Russians. Indeed, one can see the Cold War as just the sequel to “The Great Game” that the British and Russian Empires participated in during the latter 19th Century. Due to this, both nations have pushed EU expansion in recognition that it’s the best carrot to ensure Second World countries don’t backslide towards Moscow.
Western Europe does not have the luxury of being separated from Russia by a continent and sea water, and so is more used to interacting and compromising with them. The knowledge that Western Europe can be a bit “wobbly” on Russia, leads to America and Britain trying to control the continent’s policy towards Russia, most notably by both countries longstanding leeriness towards the idea of a European Army. When they say such an entity would undermine NATO, they mean it would undermine their control of NATO, given much of the Alliance’s current functions could be transferred over to the new unified army, that would naturally be staffed and commanded by Europeans. The continued hostily to the idea can be seen by Robert Shrimsley worrying that Brexit and the planned German rearmament had left Britain less important in discussions around the defence of Europe, with no consideration given to the possibility that maybe the Europeans could be left to do it by themselves.
But we should want Europe to defend itself! If America is to support its allies in the Pacific resist Chinese aggression, then it needs to engage less with Europe, especially as whereas China is larger and richer than its Western neighbours, the EU is much larger and richer than Russia. If Britain is to ensure that absent the Americans, NATO can continue to protect the Atlantic, and maybe also offer some assistance to Australia and New Zealand, then it needs to revert to being primarily a naval power rather than trying to do a little bit of everything (something that has clearly done the Russians no favours). The only way that can happen is if Europe takes the lead, and the only way that will happen if the EU takes the lead. Indeed, such a move could strengthen NATO, with Europe voting as a block within NATO (a la the WTO) having previously voted amongst themselves using Qualified Majority Voting. That would simplify decision-making and stop a rogue nation (looking at you Hungary) blocking action.
The danger of the proposed peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, is it undoes the progress made these past three weeks to unpick the idiotic decision to allow EU members, let alone ones that border Russia, to be half in, half out of The West. In the same way that Council of Europe membership is a prerequisite for EU membership, the same needs to happen for NATO, with the six remaining holdouts placed on the express train to joining the Alliance. Then everyone is clear that if Russia attacks Finland or threatens Ireland, that has the same meaning as if he menaces Estonia or Poland. Then the West can build a new defensive alliance based on the reality that the Europeans will primarily be responsible for their defence on land and in the air. And the rationale for this alliance needs to be clearly articulated, so that everyone understands why troops are placed where they are, especially those in North America who may wonder why they’re defending far away countries of which they know little, and so demand their leaders (not) act accordingly. Indeed, the creation of a European Army helps with that because it will be easier for Americans to understand that they are allied with another transcontinental superpower to protect the Atlantic than comprehend how little Lativa is essential to American defence.
Europe’s Moment
No one could have anticipated the Russians would deviate from their previous playbook in such an outrageous way as they have by invading Ukraine. But everyone should expect what’s coming next. Yes the Ukrainians are performing better than anybody expected, but Chechyna and indeed Ukraine in 2014, tells us that left to their own devices, the Russians will treat a defeat as a setback not a result. Sooner or later, they will come back stronger and crueler.
The time for deciding is now. We owe it to both Ukraine and Russia to stop dealing in half-truths or half measures. Either we encourage Ukraine to fight to the last, explore with Russia how much of Ukraine they would let join the West, or leave Ukraine to negotiate as independent an existence they can within Russia’s sphere of influence.
And it is not America or Britain’s decision to make, but Europe’s.
And for that, I don’t envy them at all.